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The neural correlates of “self” identified by neuroimaging studies differ depending on
which aspects of self are addressed. Here, three categories of self are proposed based
on neuroimaging findings and an evaluation of the likely underlying cognitive processes.
The physical self, representing self-agency of action, body-ownership, and bodily self-
recognition, is supported by the sensory and motor association cortices located primarily
in the right hemisphere. The interpersonal self, representing the attention or intentions
of others directed at the self, is supported by several amodal association cortices in the
dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices. The social self, representing the self
as a collection of context-dependent social-values, is supported by the ventral aspect of
the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex. Despite differences in the
underlying cognitive processes and neural substrates, all three categories of self are likely
to share the computational characteristics of the forward model, which is underpinned by
internal schema or learned associations between one’s behavioral output and the conse-
quential input. Additionally, these three categories exist within a hierarchical layer structure
based on developmental processes that updates the schema through the attribution of pre-
diction error. In this account, most of the association cortices critically contribute to some
aspect of the self through associative learning while the primary regions involved shift from
the lateral to the medial cortices in a sequence from the physical to the interpersonal to
the social self.
Keywords: self, self-recognition, self-awareness, body-ownership, self-agency, social cognition, associative learn-
ing, neuroimaging
INTRODUCTION
A sporadic quest for the neural basis of “self”using functional neu-
roimaging appears to have emerged at the end of the last century.
A number of researchers were interested in the cognitive processes
related to physical self-awareness during action and consequential
sensation (McGuire et al., 1996a; Blakemore et al., 1998; Fink et al.,
1999), whereas others investigated the self-relevance of memory
and knowledge (Fink et al., 1996; Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al.,
2002). An initial study evaluating stimulus-independent thought
(McGuire et al., 1996b) drew attention to the relevance of spon-
taneous neural activity during a conscious resting state (Raichle
et al., 2001) to the self-related cognitive process (Gusnard et al.,
2001). The subsequent surge in studies of self-face recognition
(Keenan et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2000)
rested primarily on an evolutionary or developmental perspec-
tive. Perceptions of others’ communicative intentions toward the
self (Kampe et al., 2003) and perspective-taking (Vogeley et al.,
2004) appear to be other independent issues. It did not take long
for researchers to realize that the cortical regions supporting self-
specific or self-relevant activation were far from consistent across
studies.
The response of researchers to this chaotic situation has also
varied considerably. Some have been pessimistic regarding the
existence of a special neural system for the self (Gillihan and
Farah, 2005; Platek et al., 2008), whereas others have remained
optimistic and attempted to identify such a system by sorting out
how previous studies have addressed the concept of self. One such
approach highlighted cortical midline structures (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006), another focused on the
right lateral cortices (Keenan et al., 2000; Feinberg and Keenan,
2005), and yet another tried to reconcile these two views (Uddin
et al., 2007).
This paper attempts to provide a unified framework for the
neural underpinnings of the self in the context of a pessimistic
stance toward the existence of a self-specific neural system.
First, neuroimaging studies investigating self-related processes
are reviewed, and the concepts of the self and their related
brain networks are roughly categorized into three areas. Then, a
unique characteristic or computational architecture that is poten-
tially common to the processes of the three categories is pro-
posed. Furthermore, I propose a layer structure characterized by
cross-layer dynamics that operates across these three categories.
Finally, the manner in which self is related to midline brain
regions in this model is discussed. The proposed model is an
updated version of one that was previously presented (Sugiura,
2011).
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THREE CATEGORIES OF SELF AND NEUROIMAGING
FINDINGS
The concepts of self or self-related processes addressed in previ-
ous neuroimaging studies may be divided into three categories:
the physical self, the interpersonal self, and the social-value of the
self. This categorization takes into account the presumably devel-
opmental context in which self-awareness is experienced as well as
the distribution of reported self-relevant activation. The known
basic functional characteristics of the relevant activated regions
will be briefly discussed.
PHYSICAL SELF
One prominent category of self is the body-grounded self that dis-
sociates one’s physical existence from the external environment.
Research on this category often focuses on the ability to dissociate
self from non-self, such as one’s own face from another’s face, one’s
own body from another’s body, one’s own action from another’s
action, and one’s own voice from another’s voice. This category of
self is conceptually unambiguous and experimental manipulation
is often clear. The concept of self in this category may overlap with
that of James’ description of “physical self” (James, 1890) or other
researchers’ descriptions of “ecological self” (Neisser, 1988) and
“minimal self” (Gallagher, 2000). This category of self is of central
interest to psychologists studying animals and infants. There is a
strong expectation of the existence of specialized neural regions
underpinning self-recognition that stems from the fact that only a
few species of animals show evidence of visual self-recognition in
the mirror (Gallup, 1982; Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009).
Neuroimaging studies investigating the cortical foundation
of the physical self have adopted three major experimental
approaches. The first approach is to contrast brain activation dur-
ing the perception of a visual or auditory stimulus relevant to
one’s own body with activation during the perception of per-
ceptually similar but self-irrelevant stimuli. Studies using this
approach present subjects with a picture or video clip of a face
or body (Kircher et al., 2000; Platek et al., 2004, 2006; Sugiura
et al., 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2012; Uddin et al., 2005; Devue et al.,
2007; Kaplan et al., 2008; Ferri et al., 2012; Oikawa et al., 2012),
or a recorded voice (Nakamura et al., 2001); the required task is
either explicit or implicit recognition (e.g., passive viewing or per-
formance of an unrelated task). The second approach addresses
the sense of body-ownership or of body-location drift, which is
illusorily induced by a synchronous sensory stimulation includ-
ing tactile stimuli (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007;
Ionta et al., 2011). Contrasting the synchronized and desynchro-
nized conditions can isolate the cortical activation related to such
a sense. The third approach deals with the sense of self-agency or
self-attribution concerning one’s own actions. Studies have iden-
tified neural activation in response to modulated visual feedback
during hand action or manipulation of a cursor or agent on a
computer (Fink et al., 1999; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008; Leube et al.,
2003; David et al., 2007; Schnell et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2008; Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010), auditory
feedback during speech (McGuire et al., 1996a; Hashimoto and
Sakai, 2003; Fu et al., 2006), and tactile feedback while tickling
oneself (Blakemore et al., 1998). Some studies have manipulated
self-agency simply by instruction (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Schnell
et al., 2007), whereas others have examined effects of the trial-by-
trial fluctuation in subjective awareness in response to the same
stimuli (David et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008).
Although the regions reportedly involved in this activation vary
across studies and approaches, they include primarily the sensory
and/or motor association cortices (Figure 1) and depend on the
sensory modality of the stimulus used. Activation of the visual
association cortices, including the ventral and dorsal pathways
(Figures 1A,B, respectively), has been reported in studies using
visual stimuli to address visual self-face or self-body recognition
(Kircher et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2012; Uddin
et al., 2005; Platek et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 2008; Ferri et al.,
2012; Oikawa et al., 2012), the illusory sense of body-ownership
or location (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Ionta et al.,
2011), and the violation or awareness of action-agency (Fink et al.,
1999; David et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; Farrer
et al., 2008; Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010). Auditory
association cortices (Figure 1C) are activated during the percep-
tion of manipulated feedback of self-voice during speaking aloud
(McGuire et al., 1996a; Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003; Fu et al., 2006).
Activation of somatosensory association cortices (Figure 1D) has
been reported in studies using tactile input to manipulate the
agency of self-tickling actions (Blakemore et al., 1998) or to induce
an illusory sense of body-ownership or location (Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Ionta et al., 2011).
Activation of motor association cortices is frequently reported
in studies in which a subject’s motor action plays a critical role
in self-relevance. These regions include the dorsal and ventral
aspects of the premotor cortex (Figures 1E,F, respectively) and
several medial motor association cortices, such as the supple-
mentary motor area (SMA; Figure 1G) and cingulate motor area
(Figure 1H). Examples of such studies include those in which
subjects executed motor action while self-agency was manipulated
(Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008; David et al., 2007;
Schnell et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; Spengler et al.,
2009; Yomogida et al., 2010).
However, the involvement of sensory or motor association cor-
tices sometimes has no apparent relevance to the sensory process-
ing of the stimulus or motor output during the task. Such involve-
ment requires explanation in terms of the internal representation
of the physical self. For example, activation of somatosensory and
premotor cortices has often been reported in studies investigating
self-face or self-body recognition using pictures (Uddin et al., 2005;
Platek et al., 2006; Sugiura et al., 2006,2008,2012; Ferri et al., 2012).
The visual–somatosensory association cortex in the intraparietal
sulcus (Figure 1I), which has been implicated in the visuospatial
motor control of extremities, has been found to be activated in
many studies on self when the task is relevant to bodily action
either directly (Fink et al., 1999; Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Farrer
et al., 2008) or indirectly (e.g., self-face or self-body recognition
using pictures involving expressions or actions) (Sugiura et al.,
2005a, 2006, 2008, 2012; Oikawa et al., 2012). Additionally, many
of these activated areas overlap with regions receiving vestibular
input, such as the medial temporal (MT) or medial superior tem-
poral (MST) areas, the ventral intraparietal area (VIP), areas 2v
and 3aV, and premotor regions (Smith et al., 2012; zu Eulenburg
et al., 2012). The insula (Figure 1J), known to include primary and
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FIGURE 1 | Neural correlates of the physical self. Sensory and motor
association cortices are schematically illustrated on the lateral (top left panel)
and medial (middle left panel) surface of the right hemisphere: visual
association cortex [ventral (A) and dorsal (B) pathways]; auditory association
cortex (C); somatosensory association cortex (D); motor association cortices
{dorsal (E) and ventral (F) parts of premotor cortex and medial regions
including the supplementary motor area [SMA, (G)] and anterior cingulate
cortex [ACC, (H)]}; and intraparietal sulcus (I). The bottom left panel shows the
schema within the opened Sylvian fissure in the right hemisphere to expose
the insular cortex (J). Examples of neuroimaging data: activation specifically
observed during self-face recognition in picture [(K) (Sugiura et al., 2012)];
activation during speech with manipulated auditory feedback of own voice [(L)
(Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003)]; activation during violated self-agency of control
of avatar in computer game [(M) (Yomogida et al., 2010)]; and awareness of
self-agency of control of cursor in computer game [(N) (Farrer and Frith,
2002)].
association cortices for interoception (sense of the physiological
conditions of the entire body) and to be involved in a wide range of
subjective feelings (Craig, 2002, 2009), is also activated without the
manipulation of interoceptive input. Activation of this region was
observed during the recognition of self-face or self-body in a pic-
ture (Kircher et al., 2000; Devue et al., 2007; Ferri et al., 2012), the
sense of action self-agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al.,
2003; Leube et al., 2003; David et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2008), and the sense of body-ownership (Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007). These findings may be explained by the
fact that bodily self-recognition is grounded by the experience of
bodily action accompanied by visual, somatosensory, vestibular,
and interoceptive feedback. These interpretations in terms of the
representational role of the sensory and motor association cor-
tices will be detailed in Section “Physical Self and Sensorimotor
Schema.”
It is interesting to note that some of these parietal sen-
sory association and frontal premotor cortices coincide with the
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visual–motor association system known as the mirror neuron sys-
tem (MNS). This apparently contradicts the incompatible concept
of “self-specific” and the MNS; which is resolved in the proposed
model (See Physical Self and Sensorimotor Schema). Mirror neu-
rons are a class of neurons that have been observed to discharge
when a monkey performs a goal-directed motor act as well as when
a monkey observes another individual performing the same or a
similar motor act (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Nelissen et al., 2011).
In humans, the MNS has been identified as a homolog of the
frontoparietal network of mirror neurons in monkeys and is con-
sidered to play a critical role in action understanding, imitation,
and communication (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni,
2005). Therefore, this system is primarily conceptualized as a
mechanism involved in recognizing and interacting with others.
Moreover, these studies reported the activation of several
amodal association cortices. Activation of the right lateral pre-
frontal cortex, specifically the inferior and middle frontal gyri, has
often been reported during the recognition of self-face or self-
body (Figure 1K) (Platek et al., 2004, 2006; Sugiura et al., 2005a,
2006, 2008, 2012; Uddin et al., 2005; Devue et al., 2007; Kaplan
et al., 2008), voice (Nakamura et al., 2001), action-agency vio-
lation (Figure 1L) (Fink et al., 1999; Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003;
David et al., 2007; Schnell et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008), and body-
ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007). The
manipulation of sensory-feedback for action often activates the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the posterior part of the superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS), and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
(McGuire et al., 1996a; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003,
2008; Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003; Leube et al., 2003; Fu et al., 2006;
Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010), which are typically
considered multimodal or amodal association cortices that are
implicated in conceptual rather than perceptual processes. These
findings will be discussed separately from sensory or motor asso-
ciation cortices in Section “Multi-Layer Structure and Cross-Layer
Dynamics.”
INTERPERSONAL SELF
When an individual notices that he or she is being looked at or
hears his/her own name being called, he/she becomes aware that
the attention or intentionality of another person is directed at
him/her. This awareness is a basic mindset during social inter-
action. This aspect of self is obviously distinct from the physical
self because it inherently requires the existence of another person.
An influential inventory, the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein
et al., 1975), particularly its public subscale, has been developed
to measure the degree to which an individual has this type of
awareness.
The activation related to this awareness is observed in several
amodal association cortices in the medial frontal and lateral poste-
rior cortices (Figure 2A). Although varying widely across studies,
activation has been identified in the MPFC encompassing the adja-
cent anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Kampe et al., 2003; Schilbach
et al., 2006; Steuwe et al., 2012), the TPJ/pSTS (Pelphrey et al.,
2004a; Schilbach et al., 2006; Steuwe et al., 2012), the anterior tem-
poral cortex (ATC) (Kawashima et al., 1999; Calder et al., 2002;
Kampe et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003), the insula (Kawashima
et al., 1999; Calder et al., 2002; Schilbach et al., 2006), and the
cerebellum (George et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003; Schilbach
et al., 2006) during the perception of directed, rather than averted,
eye-gaze. Activation of the MPFC/ACC, TPJ/pSTS, and ATC has
also been reported in studies that compare activation during the
hearing of one’s own name with the hearing of others’ names
(Figure 2B) (Kampe et al., 2003; Perrin et al., 2005; Tacikowski
et al., 2011). Activation is also observed in these regions when sub-
jects believe that they are interacting with a real person rather than
engaging in a similar but non-real interaction (Figure 2C) (Rilling
et al., 2004; Jeong et al., 2011). Additionally, subjects who score
higher on the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975)
show a larger degree of activation in the dorsal part of the MPFC
(dMPFC) during a simple sensorimotor (deviant letter detection)
task (Eisenberger et al., 2005).
However, previous studies have rarely treated self-awareness
as a central concept related to the interpretation of activation in
these cortical regions. These regions have often been recognized
as a cortical network supporting the inference of another’s mental
state,namely,mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) (Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Frith and Frith, 2006; Senju and Johnson, 2009; Spreng
et al., 2009). Furthermore, it has been proposed that this net-
work plays a role in the development of event schemata in general,
including person-schema and self-schema (Krueger et al., 2009).
The assumed properties of this network provide the basic reason-
ing for labeling this category of self the “interpersonal self,” which
will be detailed in Section “Interpersonal Self and Interpersonal
Schema.”
It is worth noting that some of these regions are deactivated
rather than activated during self-face recognition. Activation in the
TPJ/pSTS or its surrounding cortices is decreased while viewing
the self-face compared with familiar or unfamiliar faces (Sugiura
et al., 2005a, 2008; Uddin et al., 2005; Devue et al., 2007; Morita
et al., 2008), which indicates a clear neural dissociation between
physical and interpersonal selves.
SOCIAL-VALUE OF SELF
Self-reflection typically includes thoughts about one’s social-value
such as “Am I good-natured?” or “Am I good-looking?” or “Am I
intelligent?” or “Am I successful in my career?” Most of the attrib-
utes assigned to the self carry some social-value, and individuals
are typically aware of the gap between one’s current self and one’s
ideal self (Festinger, 1954; Higgins, 1987). This type of social-
value is an important aspect of the “social self” according to James
(1890) and is assumed to be an important determinant of human
behavior [e.g., Self-Efficacy Theory (Bandura, 1982)]. To experi-
mentally address this type of self in neuroimaging studies, self-trait
(e.g., personality trait, ability) judgment tasks are typically utilized.
Additionally, the perception of the evaluation of self by others,
even the perception of others who have a high or low level of an
attribute that is significant to the self (Gutierres et al., 1999), is
known to affect self-value. Although this type of self resembles
the interpersonal self in that it is highly relevant to the existence
of another person, the “person” is typically generalized to people
or society rather than confined to a specific person. Furthermore,
the interpersonal self does not necessarily involve social-value.
It is therefore reasonable to categorize self-value separately from
interpersonal self.
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FIGURE 2 | Neural correlates of interpersonal self. Relevant cortical
areas are schematically illustrated on the lateral (top panel) and medial
(bottom panel) surface of the right hemisphere (A). TPJ: temporoparietal
junction, pSTS: posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus, ATC:
anterior temporal cortex, dMPFC: dorsal part of the medial prefrontal
cortex, and ACC: anterior cingulate cortex. Examples of neuroimaging
data: activation during the perception of self-directed eye-gaze or the
hearing of one’s own name [(B); (Kampe et al., 2003)], and activation
during real communication relative to non-real condition [(C); (Jeong et al.,
2011)].
Indeed, the cortical regions implicated in self-value have, at
least in part, a different distribution than do those implicated
in the interpersonal self. Specifically, tasks that are assumed to
manipulate the social-value of self typically activate the ventral
part of the MPFC (vMPFC) and the posterior part of the cin-
gulate cortex (PCC) or its adjacent medial parietal cortex (i.e.,
the precuneus) (Figure 3A). Activation of these regions has been
reported during self-trait judgment, specifically when contrasted
with trait-valence judgment (Craik et al., 1999; Schmitz et al.,
2004) or other trait judgments (Figure 3B) (Craik et al., 1999;
Kelley et al., 2002; Heatherton et al., 2006; D’Argembeau et al.,
2007). Similarly, activation in these regions has been identified
when contrasting self-descriptive and non-descriptive trait adjec-
tives (Kircher et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004) and when the
trait adjective is correlated with self-descriptiveness (Moran et al.,
2006). Moreover, the perception of the evaluation of self by oth-
ers activates these regions (Izuma et al., 2008), particularly in
subjects whose self-evaluation is vulnerable to evaluation by oth-
ers (Somerville et al., 2010). Interestingly, the perception of the
evaluation of self by familiar others activates the dMPFC (Korn
et al., 2012), which is thought to be the neural correlate of the
interpersonal self, rather than vMPFC. This may be explained by
the fact that this experimental manipulation affects mental rep-
resentations of the self in relation to specific others rather than
those related to the value of the self, illustrating the conceptual
difference between the interpersonal self and the social-value of
the self.
Like the physical self, the social self dissociates self and other,
but it does so in a different way. The social self encompasses any
people or objects that are relevant or behaviorally significant to the
self, which are considered “other” in terms of the physical self. The
vMPFC and PCC are activated during name and face recognition
of oneself and friends relative to recognition of unfamiliar people
(Sugiura et al., 2008; Tacikowski et al., 2012),and the vMPFC is cor-
related with the amount of self-referential thought (D’Argembeau
et al., 2005). On the other hand, activation of these regions is often
absent when self-trait judgment is compared with trait judgment
about familiar people, such as friends and relatives (Schmitz et al.,
2004; Benoit et al., 2010). Self-face recognition involves activation
of the vMPFC when the number of other faces in the other trials
in the task sequence is increased, probably due to the self-value
processing induced by social comparison (Sugiura et al., 2012). In
a similar task design using young female subjects, activation of the
PCC for self-face was enhanced when the female faces in other tri-
als were less attractive, particularly when the subject’s self-esteem
was high (Oikawa et al., 2012).
Again, these cortical regions are unlikely to be utilized exclu-
sively for the processing of social-value. The vMPFC and the
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), which is sometimes regarded
as identical with or adjacently distinct from the vMPFC, are known
to represent the value of objects in general and to play critical roles
in value-based decision making (Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth
et al., 2011). This general region comprises a reward system that
operates in conjunction with other deep structures, such as the
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FIGURE 3 | Neural correlates of the social-value of self. Relevant cortical areas are schematically illustrated on the medial surface of the right hemisphere.
vMPFC: ventral part of the medial prefrontal cortex, ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, mOFC: medial orbitofrontal cortex, and PCC: posterior cingulate cortex (A).
An example of neuroimaging data: activation during self-trait judgment about the personality trait adjective [(B); (Kelley et al., 2002)].
striatum and the midbrain dopamine system, which are some-
times activated during self-trait judgment (Kircher et al., 2002;
Moran et al., 2006; Benoit et al., 2010) or perception of self-
evaluation by others (Izuma et al., 2008; Korn et al., 2012). The
relationship between the reward system and self-related processes
is a matter of recent discussion (Northoff and Hayes, 2011). The
PCC and the adjacent precuneus are involved in a wide range of
highly integrated processes, such as visuospatial imagery, episodic-
memory retrieval, and self-referential processes (Wagner et al.,
2005; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). This set of midline cortical
regions is also considered to be a major component of the default
mode network that is active during a conscious resting state and
deactivated during the execution of attention-demanding tasks
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001).
OTHER ASPECTS OF SELF
One may consider memory, especially autobiographical memory,
as a critical factor of self. Numerous functional imaging studies
have investigated the neural activity specifically observed during
the retrieval of an autobiographical memory. The medial pre-
frontal and parietal cortices, including the cingulate cortex and
the lateral temporal and parietal regions with some regions lateral-
ized to the right (Svoboda et al., 2006; Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Spreng et al., 2009) exhibit activation during such a task. These
areas overlap with the cortical regions proposed to be the neural
underpinnings of the three categories of self. This suggests that
autobiographical memory is not merely a single essential factor
but rather the “all-star” of self-related cognitive processes.
Some researchers assume perspective-taking to be a key concept
in the distinction of self from other. However, the findings of neu-
roimaging studies investigating this issue may also be explained
by the framework of the three categories of self, particularly the
physical and interpersonal selves. Many neuroimaging studies
compare first-person (1P) and third-person (3P) perspectives to
address this issue. Cortical activation is typically more prominent
in a 3P rather than a 1P perspective, but activation of associated
brain regions varies widely across studies. These findings were
somewhat clarified when perspective-taking was divided into visu-
ospatial and mental perspectives, and activation was assumed to
reflect the increased cognitive load related to the non-canonical
nature of the 3P perspective. Greater activation for 3P visuospatial
perspective-taking relative to 1P visuospatial perspective-taking is
typically reported in the visual association and premotor cortices
(Vogeley et al., 2004; David et al., 2006, 2008a), which overlap
with the neural correlates of the physical self. This finding may be
explained by the cognitive load involved in the imaginary physical-
location change (i.e., moving self-body) required to obtain a non-
canonical 3P viewpoint. Regarding mental perspective-taking, a
greater activation for the 3P relative to the 1P perspective is fre-
quently reported in the pSTS/TPJ and dMPFC (Ruby and Decety,
2001, 2003, 2004; David et al., 2008a; Schnell et al., 2011; Ramsey
et al., 2013), which overlap with the neural correlates of the inter-
personal self. This overlap appears to be reasonable because taking
the mental perspective of others (intention, emotion, belief) is
synonymous with ToM. On the other hand, many of these studies
have reported a greater activation in the 1P compared with the
3P perspective in the MPFC and PCC, which are the proposed
neural correlates of the social self. It is often difficult to conclu-
sively attribute this finding to self-cognition, since it is usually
explained by either behavioral significance (i.e., the social self) or
differential default mode activity (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle
et al., 2001) due to differences in task difficulty (McKiernan et al.,
2003).
HYPOTHESIS: THREE LAYERS OF INTERNAL SCHEMA
In the preceding section, the self was divided into three individual
categories that differ according to the related supporting cogni-
tive processes and neural substrates. The current section, however,
proposes a common characteristic or computational architecture
that underlies the processes of these three categories. In short,
the common characteristic is a forward prediction model, which
is a rather common and classical conceptualization in models of
the physical self. It has been assumed that the physical self is the
product of an associative learning process based on the repeated
experiences of bodily motion and sensory-feedback.
Here, a novel attempt will be made to adapt the forward pre-
diction model to the interpersonal and social selves with the
intention of explaining all categories of self within the framework
of associative learning. A critical component of this adaptation
is the internal schema that denotes the association between the
neural-representation of the output plan and the feedback input
(Figures 4A,B); this schema is assumed to exist for each target of
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the output and is modified depending on context. In this view,
the self may be defined as a label for the capability of forward
prediction (Figure 4B) in any system that has such characteristics.
Neuroimaging findings appear to be explained by top-down and
bottom-up attention to the schema that is typically driven by task
requirements and prediction error, respectively.
Conceptually, the schema is the basis for all cognitive opera-
tions, including perception and behavioral control. The schema is
used as an inverse model to plan output (Figure 4C) or even to
represent each element of the external environment and may be
used to simulate a schema of the mind of another; that is, to infer
the internal process of others based on the observed output of that
person. Given the diverse utility of the schema, the self is only a
phenomenon that is occasionally experienced during its function-
ing, while reflecting the very basic characteristics of the schema.
Additionally, a hierarchical layer structure of the three categories of
self and the dynamics across the layers are also important features
of the proposed model. The hierarchical structure stems from the
developmental relationship between the three schemata and serves
as the basis of cross-layer interaction, which may be critical for the
integrity of the three self-concepts.
PHYSICAL SELF AND SENSORIMOTOR SCHEMA
The concept of the forward model was first applied to explain
the sense of self-agency in action. The sense of self-agency, or the
self-attribution of action, is widely assumed to have been derived
from the consistency between the sensory input that results from
action and the prediction emerging from the action intention or
collateral output from the motor system (Figure 4B) (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999; Sato and Yasuda, 2005; David et al., 2008b).
One is convinced that the observed action of one’s own hand
is actually performed by oneself because the action is somatically
experienced (i.e., somatosensory perception) and looks (i.e., visual
perception) as predicted. Frith and colleagues (Frith et al., 2000;
Frith, 2005) incorporated this conceptualization into a detailed
cognitive model by extending the model of feed-forward motor
control (Wolpert et al., 1995) to explain the impairment in the
sense of self-agency, or the delusion of control, which is a charac-
teristic symptom of schizophrenia. In this model, the prediction
of sensory input as a consequence of action is based on intended
motor commands and cancels actual input. Subjectively, a success-
ful cancelation is experienced as one’s unawareness of the sensory
consequences of one’s own actions and is exemplified as the atten-
uated sensation of self-generated tickling (Weiskrantz et al., 1971;
Blakemore et al., 1999). In functional neuroimaging, this cance-
lation is detected as an attenuation of the activation related to
sensory processing when sensory input is caused by self-generated
action rather than being externally produced (Blakemore et al.,
1998). More frequently, in fact, this functioning is captured as an
increase in activation during the violation of action self-agency
due to experimental manipulation (McGuire et al., 1996a; Fink
et al., 1999; Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003; Fu et al., 2006; David
et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2008;
Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010).
Here, the concept of a sensorimotor schema, or the learned
association between one’s motor plan and the feedback sensory
input (Figure 4D), is introduced. The sensorimotor schema exists
for each effector or movement coordinated by multiple muscles
and is adaptively modified depending on physical context, includ-
ing posture and the external physical environment. The evidence
that the schema is indeed constructed through associative learning
has been experimentally provided; the repeated experience of an
action and its effect on an object on a computer monitor later pro-
duce the sense of action self-agency for that virtual effector, and
the related neural responses are similar to those seen in previous
studies of action self-agency (Schnell et al., 2007; Spengler et al.,
2009; Yomogida et al., 2010). The sensorimotor schema allows
for the generalization of the forward model to different phenom-
ena of the physical self, such as the sense of body-ownership and
self-face recognition in non-contingent images (e.g., static images,
prerecorded videos). It has been shown that body-ownership
requires a pre-existing internal representation of the position of
the limbs (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard,
2007). Given that such a representation is constructed and con-
tinuously updated by matching the feed-forward prediction and
re-afferent sensory input during active movement (Synofzik et al.,
2006; Tsakiris et al.,2006), this representation is closely related to or
identical with a sensorimotor schema. Self-face recognition ability
in a non-contingent image is also likely to depend on a sensorimo-
tor schema. Infants seem to consolidate the visual representation
of one’s own face into long-term memory during the experience of
viewing a contingent self-face in the mirror; this idea is supported
by the observation that self-face recognition first develops in a
contingent and then in a non-contingent image (Bigelow, 1981).
Therefore, the unique characteristic of the visual representation of
the self-face seems to be realized by its association with the expe-
rience of action self-agency or body-ownership and, thus, with a
sensorimotor schema.
The activation of sensory and motor association cortices related
to the physical self is parsimoniously explained by attention to the
sensorimotor schema. In this situation, it is advantageous to sepa-
rate top-down from bottom-up attention. Top-down attention is
induced by a variety of experimental manipulations in which the
use of information in the schema is necessary or advantageous.
Activation of sensory or motor association cortices is observed
when perceived motion is explicitly required to be self-produced
(Farrer and Frith, 2002) or when the task demands monitoring of
one’s own motor action control (Ogawa and Inui, 2007; Schnell
et al., 2007). On the other hand, bottom-up attention is typically
driven by prediction error, which may contribute to a recalibra-
tion of the schema. This line of interpretation most likely refers
to neural activation in response to manipulated sensory-feedback,
that is, a violation of self-agency in action (McGuire et al., 1996a;
Blakemore et al., 1998; Fink et al., 1999; Farrer et al., 2003, 2008;
Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003; Fu et al., 2006; David et al., 2007;
Schnell et al., 2007; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2008; Spengler
et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010). Activation while experienc-
ing a sense of body-ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Tsakiris
et al., 2007; Ionta et al., 2011) and bodily self-recognition in a
non-contingent image (Uddin et al., 2005; Platek et al., 2006; Sug-
iura et al., 2006, 2008, 2012) may be attributed to either type of
attention. The commonality of attention and consciousness may
explain the activation of these regions in terms of top-down access
to information in the schema. The activation is also attributable
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FIGURE 4 | Concept of internal schema. Repeated experience of output
and feedback input (A) results in development of internal schema, which is
an association between the neural-representation of an output plan and
that of feedback input (B); the schema enables forward prediction, which
underlies the sense of self in any category. The schema is not exclusively
dedicated to self-cognition but is used as an inverse model to plan output
to obtain intended feedback input (C). A different internal schema underlies
each category of self: the sensorimotor schema associates motor plan
with sensory-feedback to develop the physical self (D), the interpersonal
schema associates one’s own action plan with feedback on the social
responses by others to develop the interpersonal self (E), and the
social-value schema associates one’s behavioral plan with consequential
social evaluation to represents the self as a collection of
context-dependent social-values (F).
to prediction error when perceptual input differs from what was
expected: illusion-induced body-ownership may be imperfect, and
some strange feelings may remain if the presented self-face picture
is somewhat different from what one usually sees in the mirror
while one remains sure that the face is one’s own.
The sensorimotor schema explains not only self-cognition but
also any cognitive operation related to one’s physical interac-
tion with the external environment. In fact, the forward model,
as adapted to self-cognition, was originally developed for motor
control (Wolpert et al., 1995), and the concept of sensorimotor
schema was adopted from that model. The sensorimotor schema,
or the association of the motor plan with sensory-feedback, may
be used as an inverse model to calculate the motor plan to obtain
the intended sensory-feedback (Figure 4C). This idea is consis-
tent with the conceptual framework of ideomotor theory, which
assumes a common coding of action and consequential perception
(Prinz, 1997). Furthermore, the sensorimotor schema may play a
critical role in an individual’s mental representation of the physical
environment. A person can have intention and a motor plan for
interaction with many objects in the immediate external environ-
ment (e.g., gazing, reaching), and an essential property of the phys-
ical environment is this potential interaction, which may be repre-
sented in the sensorimotor schema. This notion is compatible with
the fact that the cortical areas implicated in sensory or spatial atten-
tion overlap primarily with those supporting the sensorimotor
schema (Downar et al., 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
Furthermore, the sensorimotor schema seems to be exploited
to simulate the schema of others; that is, it can be used to infer
the intention or action goals of others. The schema may gain the
simulation ability by associating one’s own motor output with the
perceived contingent motor action of others in an interactive sit-
uation where the self and others share an intention or action goal.
Such an interactive environment is common in the daily relation-
ship between infants and their caretakers (Kaye and Fogel, 1980;
Cohn and Tronick, 1988). This view is consonant with the hypoth-
esis that the MNS is forged by sensorimotor association learning
(Heyes, 2010). Further, this view implicate that the mirror neu-
rons are a subcomponent of the simulation-capable sensorimotor
schema that associates one’s own motor actions not only with the
same action but also with different but related actions of others.
This is supported by the fact that, in the cortical areas reported
to accommodate mirror neurons in primates, there are a greater
number of “counter-mirror neurons,” which code other’s actions
that are different from, but related to, one’s own actions (Gallese
et al., 1996). Also, in a human neuroimaging study, activation
of such regions was greater during observation of other’s actions
that were complimentary (i.e., in joint action) to one’s own actions
than during observation of immitative actions (Newman-Norlund
et al., 2007). Additionally, activation during the observation of
another’s actions is not limited to the classic human MNS (i.e.,
inferior parietal and frontal cortices) but has also been identified
in multiple visual and motor association cortices (Caspers et al.,
2010).
INTERPERSONAL SELF AND INTERPERSONAL SCHEMA
The existence of forward prediction during an individual’s social
interaction may be empirically or intuitively plausible. An implicit
expectation about the range of possible responses usually arises
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 535 | 8
Sugiura Associative account of self-cognition
in situations in which one individual greets another. This is why
people become surprised at an unexpected response or the lack of a
response from the other person. The range of expected responses
greatly differs depending on the identity of the responder (i.e.,
degree of familiarity and various demographic factors such as age,
gender, cultural background, and situational context). The range
of expected responses is likely to be updated after repeated expe-
riences of prediction error with a specific familiar person or a
specific type of unfamiliar persons.
In this context, it appears reasonable to assume the existence
of an interpersonal schema that represents a link between one’s
social action (i.e., output plan) and the expected responses (i.e.,
feedback) of others (Figure 4E). The schema is constructed fol-
lowing repeated exploratory social interactions in daily life; that
is, through associative learning involving one’s own social actions
toward a person and the feedback (Figures 4A,B). The schema
exists for each familiar person or for a specific type of people and
is adaptively modified depending on social contextual cues such as
time, place, and occasion. These characteristics are comparable to
those of the sensorimotor schema in terms of the way the schema
develops, that the schema exists for each target of output, and that
it is modified depending on context.
Several neuroimaging findings support the conceptualization
of the interpersonal schema as the basis of the interpersonal self.
Activation related to the interpersonal self appears to be explained
by either top-down or bottom-up attention related to the interper-
sonal schema in a way that is similar to the relationship between
the physical self and the sensorimotor schema. It appears reason-
able to regard awareness that another’s attention or intention is
directed at oneself as an example of top-down attention to the
interpersonal schema. In other words, activation of several medial
and lateral posterior cortices during the perception of self-directed
eye-gaze (Calder et al., 2002; Kampe et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003;
Pelphrey et al., 2004a; Schilbach et al., 2006; Steuwe et al., 2012),
hearing one’s own name being called (Kampe et al., 2003; Perrin
et al., 2005; Tacikowski et al., 2011), or real-time interaction with
others (Rilling et al., 2004; Jeong et al., 2011) may reflect one’s
top-down attention to the representation of the other’s potential
response to one’s own social action. Bottom-up attention is also
represented by neural activation in this region in response to pre-
diction error or the perception of an unexpected social response as
feedback to one’s own action. During a simple two-player strategy
game, when the subject believes that the opponent is responding
based on the prediction of the subject’s next action, the predic-
tion error of the perceived opponent’s action induces activation in
these regions (Hampton et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the functioning of the interpersonal schema is
not specific to self-cognition but also relates to any cognitive oper-
ation associated with interpersonal interaction. The schema may
be used as an inverse model to calculate the behavioral plan of
social action toward another person to obtain an intended social
response (Figure 4C). Accordingly, the neural correlates of the
schema are more activated during speech production toward a
virtual agent than during an overt description of the situation
(Sassa et al., 2007). An individual can have an intention and a plan
of social interaction (or of no interaction) in relation to many peo-
ple in the immediate social environment. An essential property of
the immediate social environment is this potential, which is rep-
resented in the interpersonal schema. A similar notion, referred
to as “social attention,” is thought to be supported by the same
cortical network (Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009). Furthermore,
the simulation capacity of the interpersonal schema, or the infer-
ence of the intention and plan of another’s social action based on
perceived action, may partially overlap with ToM and may explain
the overlap of their neural correlates (Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Frith and Frith, 2006; Spreng et al., 2009). However, it is important
to note that ToM addresses both the social and non-social beliefs
and intentions of others. According to a theory of the role of
this network in the development of event schemata in general, the
MPFC is assumed to support an abstract dynamic summary repre-
sentation in the form of event simulators, and its interaction with
posterior cortical areas is assumed to comprise knowledge of social
events (Krueger et al., 2009). Activation of the implicated corti-
cal regions has been reported in studies evaluating the detection
of prediction-violating behavior or objects in the absence of self-
involvement or social context (Grezes et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al.,
2004b; Wakusawa et al., 2009). Thus, the mature interpersonal
schema functions independent of self-cognition and comprises
one aspect of a cognitive system supporting higher social and non-
social processes. Nevertheless, working from the perspective that
the evolution of intelligence in primates has been driven by social
demand (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1988), it is tempt-
ing to assume that the initial interpersonal schema is the origin of
the entire system.
SOCIAL-VALUE SCHEMA
Forward prediction is also plausible during the evaluation of
one’s own social-value. People are surprised when they receive
an extremely high or low evaluation for a certain behavior; that
is, an individual is relatively unaware of having obtained an eval-
uation when the evaluation is within the predicted range. It is
assumed that humans have multiple self-concepts and that self-
value is dependent on social role (e.g., parent, friend, worker)
(Stryker and Statham, 1985; Markus and Cross, 1990; Roberts and
Donahue, 1994). Thus, it appears reasonable to assume a specific
range of the predicted evaluation for each contextual role, and this
is updated through the feedback of prediction error.
It is assumed herein that the social-value schema represents a
link between one’s social behavior (i.e., output plan) and the pre-
dicted evaluation of this behavior (i.e., feedback) (Figure 4F). This
schema is constructed for each contextual role through repeated
experiences with social evaluations, which result in the learning of
associations between one’s own social behaviors and the evaluative
feedback they elicit (Figures 4A,B). Again, these characteristics are
comparable to those of the sensorimotor or interpersonal schemas
in terms of the way the schema develops, that the schema exists for
each target of output, and that it is modified depending on con-
text. This idea is congruent with the known general roles of the
neural correlates of this schema: the vMPFC (as well as the ACC
and mOFC) represents values (Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth et al.,
2011), and the PCC (and precuneus) processes the different aspects
of social or autobiographical contexts (Addis et al., 2004; Gilboa
et al., 2004; Chiao et al., 2009) and different types of perspectives
(Vollm et al., 2006; Mano et al., 2009).
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Neuroimaging findings relevant to the social-value of the self
are likely explained by either top-down or bottom-up attention
related to the social-value schema. The activation of the vMPFC
and PCC during self-trait judgment (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al.,
2002; Schmitz et al., 2004; Heatherton et al., 2006; D’Argembeau
et al., 2007), perception of self-descriptive trait adjectives (Kircher
et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2006), and percep-
tion of self-evaluation by others (Izuma et al., 2008; Somerville
et al., 2010) may reflect top-down attention to the social-value
schema. Activation of these regions in terms of bottom-up atten-
tion in response to unexpected evaluations of one’s behavior was
found in a study using monetary rewards for a simple estimation
game involving a pair of players. These regions exhibited greater
activation when the payment to the two players was unequal for
the same correct performance (i.e., prediction error in evaluation)
than when it was equal (Fliessbach et al., 2007).
The functioning of the social-value schema is also not specific
to self-evaluation but operates for any cognitive operation related
to social-value. The schema may be used as an inverse model to
calculate the behavioral plan for obtaining an intended social eval-
uation (Figure 4C). The activation of the vMPFC and PCC during
moral judgment is greater when the situation is more realistic (i.e.,
relevant to the real-life evaluation of self), such as when the deci-
sion is situation-based rather than rule-based (Robertson et al.,
2007) or when the potential victim of the decision is humanized
by mentalizing manipulation (Majdandzic et al., 2012). In daily
life, we are intermittently engaged in such behavioral planning on
the basis of the social-value of the self, while it is interrupted dur-
ing execution of a specific attention-demanding task. This appears
to be a plausible explanation for the activation of these areas dur-
ing the conscious resting state (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al.,
2001). Furthermore, the simulation capacity of the social-value
schema (i.e., the making of inferences regarding the intentions
and plans related to another’s social behavior) may explain the
activation of these regions during social-value judgments about
others (Craik et al., 1999; Schmitz et al., 2004; Sugiura et al., 2004;
Ochsner et al., 2005; Benoit et al., 2010). Given the general role
of the vMPFC and PCC in value-based decision making (Rangel
et al., 2008; Rushworth et al., 2011) and their specific roles in highly
integrated visuospatial and memory retrieval processes (Wagner
et al., 2005; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006), respectively, it seems fair
to consider the social-value schema as only a subcomponent of the
functioning of this neural system.
MULTI-LAYER STRUCTURE AND CROSS-LAYER DYNAMICS
It is further proposed that the three categories of self, or inter-
nal schemata, comprise a hierarchical layered structure in that the
maturation of one layer, or schema, serves as the basis for the
development of the next layer. Additionally, the prediction error
generated in one layer may result in an updating of the schema
not only in that layer but also in adjacent layers. These cross-layer
dynamics may be, in part, responsible for both the integrity of the
categories and the ambiguity across the three self-concepts.
The self-layers are assumed to develop in the following order:
sensorimotor, interpersonal, and social-value. The development
of a higher layer is dependent on the maturation of the inter-
nal schema in a lower layer; here, the maturation of the schema
denotes the acquisition of the potential to simulate the schema of
others.
In terms of the sensorimotor schema, the acquisition of the
potential to infer the intention or action goal of others corre-
sponds to an infant’s discovery of an “other” or an agent who
has a similar mental mechanism to the self. This discovery of an
other is the very basis of the development of the interpersonal
schema that requires the execution of social action toward the
other and the understanding of the other’s social response. In fact,
a similar concept to this simulation potential has been conceptu-
alized in a recent hierarchical self-model as the Bodily Social Self
(BSS), which links Phenomenal Self and Narrative Self (Farmer
and Tsakiris, 2012); the former seems to correspond to self-body-
dedicated (premature) physical self, and the latter to interpersonal
self and social-value of self, together, in the proposed model. This
simulation capacity, or the BSS, is included in the physical self
in this neural-representation model because both types of self
are accommodated by the sensorimotor schema. The maturation
process, the acquisition of a simulation capacity by the sensori-
motor schema, is assumed to develop in the first 6 months of life
in infants (Kaye and Fogel, 1980; Cohn and Tronick, 1988), and
its failure to develop has been proposed as responsible for the
impaired development of sociality in autism (Gergely, 2001).
The next step of development is triggered by the maturation of
the interpersonal schema. The acquisition of a simulation capacity,
ToM or mentalizing ability, by the interpersonal schema enables
one to conceive of the representation of self in another’s mind.
The collection of such self-representations in many others’ minds
allows abstraction of the value of self to construct the social-
value schema. This internalization process is taken for granted in
developmental theories of social self-concepts, with the process,
presumably, peaking in adolescence (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934;
Harter, 1985). Accordingly, self-dominant activation during judg-
ment about significant social attributes is observed in the vMPFC
in adults and in the dMPFC in adolescents (Pfeifer et al., 2007).
This probably reflects the ongoing self-value abstraction process
in the interpersonal schema.
The cross-layer functioning of the error-based updating of the
schema adds tremendous complexity to one’s self-related experi-
ences as well as to the interpretation of neuroimaging findings. For
example, prediction error in the sensory-feedback in response to
an action by a subject may produces a sense or belief that the action
is performed by another person rather than a feeling of strangeness
in one’s own action; that is, error-based updates do not influence
the sensorimotor schema but the interpersonal schema. Indeed,
the experimental manipulation of sensory-feedback during the
moving of a hand by a subject or during the manipulation of an
agent on a computer monitor activates the TPJ/pSTS and dMPFC
(McGuire et al., 1996a; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003,
2008; Hashimoto and Sakai, 2003; Leube et al., 2003; Fu et al., 2006;
Spengler et al., 2009; Yomogida et al., 2010), which are impli-
cated in the interpersonal schema. An abnormal functioning of
this cross-layer error-attribution (i.e., attribution to other) is con-
sidered to explain several symptoms of schizophrenia, including
the delusion of control (Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2005).
Another example is the case in which prediction error in the
self-value layer influences the interpersonal schema. Unexpectedly
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high or low evaluation of the self by another is assumed to cause
change in self-value but, alternatively, may be attributed to an
idiosyncratic viewpoint or attitude of the evaluator (interpersonal
schema). One example may be a case in which one thinks “his rec-
ognizing me as stupid is not because I am stupid, but because
he is stupid.” In the experimental setting, feedback evaluation
toward the self is typically provided by a small number of alleged
evaluators, and it is highly likely that cross-layer attribution does
occur. This consideration is congruent with data identifying neural
responses that are positively correlated with self-value prediction
error (i.e., discrepancy between a subject’s own evaluation of the
self and the evaluation by others) in the major components of the
interpersonal schema (Korn et al., 2012).
The implementation of hierarchical layer structure and cross-
layers error-attribution, in addition to the association-based gen-
eration of the internal schema and its prediction-error-based
update per se, makes this model conform to the Hierarchical
Bayesian model based on the free-energy principle (Friston, 2010).
This conformity may suggest a future potential sophistication of
this model in the Bayesian framework. The proposed model may,
therefore, provide an example of successful adoption of this com-
prehensive framework to cognitive processes that cover perception
to higher-level cognition accompanying empirical data.
Several cortical areas may play a unique role in the coordina-
tion of functioning across multiple layers. Specifically, the right
lateral prefrontal cortex may have a role in resolving conflicts in
different layers. This region is activated during sensory-feedback
manipulation when it obviously conflicts with motor control (Fink
et al., 1999) or when agency-attribution judgment (i.e., self or
other) is required (David et al., 2007; Schnell et al., 2007; Farrer
et al., 2008). It has been proposed that this region is responsible
for an impaired belief-validation process during the mirrored-self
misidentification (mirror sign) due to a failure to resolve the con-
flict between self-face recognition and contingency detection when
either process is abnormal (Coltheart, 2007, 2010). Apparently
consistent with this view, activation in the right lateral prefrontal
cortex is frequently reported during the recognition of self-face
or self-body in non-contingent images (Platek et al., 2004, 2006;
Sugiura et al., 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2012; Uddin et al., 2005; Devue
et al., 2007; Kaplan et al., 2008). Moreover, this region responds to
behavior that violates social norms (i.e., error in the interpersonal
layer) (Wakusawa et al., 2009) or when there are discrepancies
between a subject’s self-evaluation and the evaluation by others
(i.e., error in the social-value layer) (Korn et al., 2012).
In summary, the concept of an internal schema with three layers
operating under the assumption of cross-layer dynamics provides
a relatively simple integrated conceptual framework for the self-
concept. In this framework, associative learning and the hierarchi-
cal structure of the cortical network appear sufficient to explain
the wide range of behavioral, developmental, and neuroimaging
findings related to self-cognition.
ROLE OF MIDLINE STRUCTURES
In the proposed model, a majority of the association cortices in
both lateral and medial structures critically contribute to some
aspect of self. This view may be inconsistent with the notion of a
special role for the midline regions in self-cognition, which might
be implied by this topic. Based on the size of areas included, how-
ever, it is possible to characterize the contribution of the midline
regions in the following manner: they are most relevant to the
social-value layer, less relevant to the interpersonal layer, and least
relevant to the sensorimotor layer. This characterization is largely
congruent with the view that has previously been discussed (Uddin
et al., 2007).
Within the proposed conceptual framework, the primary inter-
est regarding midline structures concerns the functional demar-
cation of the neural correlates of each schema. The border of
the cortical correlates for each self-layer parallels the functional
segregation of the midline structures.
In the frontal lobe, the border between the cortical correlates
of the sensorimotor and interpersonal schema may be reasonably
defined as the border between the premotor cortex (Brodmann
area 6) and the posterior part of the prefrontal cortex (Brodmann
area 8) given the motor-associated and amodal nature of these
schemata, respectively. A review of neuroimaging findings eval-
uating the dorsal part of the medial frontal lobe suggests that
the border is a few centimeters rostral to the vertical plane cross-
ing through the anterior commissure (AC). Clusters of activation
peaks related to attention to action or to sensation are located
posteriorly, and those related to concepts are located anteriorly
(Seitz et al., 2006). The location of this functional border appears
largely congruent with the cytoarchitectonic border between area
6 and area 8 (Geyer, 2004). The border between the regions for
the interpersonal and social-value schema, on the other hand, has
been defined only functionally. Previous reviews have consistently
demonstrated a functional inhomogeneity of the MPFC as the
dorsal and ventral regions tend to be involved in cognitive and
emotional processes, respectively. However, the proposed level of
a horizontal plane for that border has varied across studies (i.e.,
from running through the AC to 20 mm above the AC) (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009).
In the medial parietal lobe, the extent of the cortical correlates
of the social-value schema remains inconclusive but may encom-
pass the entire precuneus and PCC. This region contains multiple
functional subareas that are specialized for the processing of par-
ticular components of the implicated roles in this region, such as
episodic-memory retrieval, visual imagery, and the representation
of a personally familiar place (Sugiura et al., 2005b; Wagner et al.,
2005; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Summerfield et al., 2009; Zhang
and Li, 2012). Although all of these processes appear to be rele-
vant in some way to the processing of contextual roles, a detailed
account of the association of these processes with respect to the
concept of the social-value schema is extremely premature.
CONCLUSION
The framework proposed herein is an attempt to rescue the inte-
grated construct of self from the pessimistic view arguing against
the existence of self-specific neural system. The concepts of self
appear to be parsimoniously arranged into three categories accord-
ing to the contexts of awareness and development as well as the
implicated cortical regions. According to the proposed model,
the internal schema, which represents the learned associations
between behavioral output and feedback input, enables the sys-
tem to engage in forward prediction and explains the sense of
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self in all three categories. Importantly, the internal schema is not
exclusively dedicated to self-cognition but is the very basis of the
cognitive system underpinning interaction with a physical or social
environment. Additionally, the schemata for these three categories
of self comprise a hierarchical layer structure in terms of their
developmental and updating processes.
The sensorimotor schema, namely, the association of a motor
plan with feedback sensory input acquired through exploratory
motor activity, is supported by sensory and motor association
cortices and results in a sense of a physical self representing self-
agency of action, body-ownership, and bodily self-recognition.
As the schema matures, it becomes capable of simulating the
intention or action goals of others. This allows one to explore
and experience social interaction in which the interpersonal
schema, or the association of one’s own social action with sub-
sequent social responses that serve as feedback, is developed in
the amodal association cortices of the dMPFC and lateral pos-
terior cortices (e.g., pSTS/TPJ and ATC). While allowing for
the experience of the interpersonal self, which is the aware-
ness of self-directed attention or the intention of others, the
interpersonal schema also matures to accommodate the repre-
sentation of the self in another’s mind. The collection of such
self-representations in many others’ minds enables the develop-
ment of the social-value schema, which evaluates one’s social
behavior and feedback evaluation. This schema, supported by
the vMPFC and PCC, enables the operation of the social self
and represents the self as a collection of context-dependent
social-values.
The model proposed herein explains the large variety of acti-
vated regions that have been reported by studies addressing self-
related cognitive processes as well as their involvement in non-
self-related processes. It also provides a unique perspective on
the relationship between self-cognition and the cognitive system
involved in one’s interaction with the physical or social envi-
ronment. In particular, the assumed layer structure provides for
the development, complexity, and integrity of three categories of
the self. This view understands the different, but not mutually
exclusive, roles of the midline and lateral cortical regions in self-
cognition in terms of the different medial–lateral distribution of
the three internal schemas. With respect to midline structures,
due to the different sizes of the areas that each internal schema
occupies, the characteristics of the self may be ranked as follows
in term of prominence: social-value self, interpersonal self, and
physical self.
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